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A business email compromise wire-fraud tabletop: who should be in the room, and what should the exercise test?

Quick answer, Nov 22, 2026As of 22 November 2026, CISA's list of cybersecurity tabletop packages names no stand-alone business email compromise scenario, so adapt one. Seat whoever approves payments, whoever calls the bank, the executive whose mailbox is used, IT security, legal and HR. Test first whether anyone verifies a bank-detail change through a channel the email did not supply.

Why this scenario needs its own exercise

The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) defines business email compromise (BEC) as a scam "targeting businesses or individuals working with suppliers and/or businesses regularly performing wire transfer payments", carried out by "compromising email accounts and other forms of communication such as phone numbers and virtual meeting applications" (IC3 2025 Annual Report, Appendix B, "Definitions and Descriptors"). The same report counts 24,768 BEC complaints in 2025 and $3,046,598,558 in reported losses ("2025 Crime Types", "By Complaint Count" and "By Complaint Loss").

CISA's Tabletop Exercise Packages say, under "Cybersecurity Scenarios", that the cyber packages cover "ransomware, insider threats, phishing, and Industrial Control System (ICS) compromise". The Cybersecurity Scenarios download list, as opened on 22 November 2026, has no package titled for BEC. The nearest material sits inside two other packages:

  • Executives and Senior Leadership (August 2024). In Vignette 1, "Whaling/Ransomware", "employees begin reporting to <HR/Finance/Payroll> that their paychecks were not deposited into their bank accounts".
  • Financial Services (July 2024). In Module 1, "Day 6", "Your accounts payable department receives an email appearing to be from your TSP", and the provider later says it "did not email the invoices".

Two neighbouring guides cover the human channels. Training staff to spot deepfake impersonation covers the cloned voice that reaches a payment approver. The help-desk drill covers the caller who wants an account. This page covers the email that changes where the money goes.

Six injects, and who answers each

InjectWhat it testsWho answersWhere it is written
1. A known supplier emails new bank details before a due invoiceWhether the change is verified through a channel the email did not supplyAccounts payableIC3, Business Email Compromise, "Stay Protected"
2. The request arrives on a phone and the sender's address is one character offWhether staff check the full address before actingAccounts payable, executive assistantsSame page, "Stay Protected"
3. The email really did come from your executive's mailboxWhether IT can tell a spoofed address from a compromised account, and who locks itIT securityIC3 PSA I-091124-PSA, "Definition"
4. The wire has goneWho calls the originating bank to request a recall and the indemnity paperwork, and how fastTreasury or finance leadIC3 Business Email Compromise, "Contact Your Bank"
5. The complaintWho files with IC3, with full transaction details and any "second hop" transfersFinance lead with IT securityIC3 2025 Annual Report, "IC3 Recovery Asset Team - Financial Fraud Kill Chain in 2025"
6. HR receives a direct-deposit change, or a request for employee recordsWhether the payroll path gets the same check as the supplier pathHR and payrollIC3 PSA I-060923-PSA, "Definition"; Executives CTEP, Vignette 1

Each cited passage describes the technique or step; the seat is this page's reading.

IC3's prevention advice is to "Use secondary channels or two-factor authentication to verify requests for changes in account information with the intended recipient" ("Stay Protected"). For victims, it says "Contact the originating Financial Institution as soon as fraud is recognized to request a recall or reversal as well as a Hold Harmless Letter or Letter of Indemnity" ("Contact Your Bank"). It also says "It is vital the complaint contain all required data in provided fields, including banking information" ("File a Complaint"). PSA I-060923-PSA adds that "The scam is not always associated with a transfer-of-funds request", which is why row 6 exists.

What the bank inject must not promise

The exercise should not end with the money coming back. IC3's wording is conditional: "IC3 may be able to assist both the financial institutions and law enforcement in freezing funds" (2025 Annual Report, "IC3 Recovery Asset Team - Financial Fraud Kill Chain in 2025"). CISA's own case study in the Executives package ends with the money having gone "directly to the threat actor" and "not recovered" (Appendix A, "Whaling Attack Devastates Hedge Fund").

The pre-work question is the bank's. PSA I-091124-PSA says "Different financial institutions have varying policies; it is important to know what assistance your financial institution will provide when attempting to recover funds" ("How to Protect Yourself/Business"). Ask your bank before the exercise, and put the answer in the facilitator guide.

Who should be in the room

The Executives package says players "may include senior-level leadership, the Chief Information Security Officer/information security personnel, emergency management personnel, human resources personnel, legal personnel, external partners, and any other personnel with a role in incident response" ("Participant Roles and Responsibilities"). That list does not name accounts payable or treasury. For a wire scenario, they are the people with "a role in incident response", so seat them. That is this page's reading of the package.

NIST SP 800-84 section 4.2.3, "Identify the Objectives", lists "validating participants’ roles and responsibilities as documented in the plan" among a tabletop's objectives, alongside validating the plan's content and its interdependencies. SP 800-84 is written for IT plans, and applying it to a payment procedure is this page's reading. Section 4.3, "Develop the Tabletop Exercise Material", warns that "it is often more effective to develop a short, concise scenario". One supplier, one invoice and one changed account are enough.

To split senior and operational rooms, see the developer-tool tabletop. For writing objectives and naming the facilitator and data collector, see the AI-agent tabletop. To choose between a tabletop and a functional exercise, see which exercise to run. Training for staff travelling to high-risk countries is a separate purchase: see hostile environment (HEAT) training.

Before you book a facilitator

Ask three things. Will they build the injects from your real payment approval steps and supplier onboarding? Can they write in a bank contact who answers the recall call? Will the after action report name each gap against a step in your payment procedure?

For a facilitator, an exercise built around your payment process, or a response firm on retainer, brief an advisor and we arrange a partner firm.

Questions

We already run phishing simulations. Do we still need a tabletop? They answer different questions. SP 800-84 section 4.2.3 lists validating roles and responsibilities in the plan among a tabletop's objectives. Here: who calls the bank, who files with IC3 and who locks the mailbox.

Will a tabletop get our money back after a real BEC? No exercise guarantees that. IC3 says only that it "may be able to assist" in freezing funds (2025 Annual Report, "IC3 Recovery Asset Team - Financial Fraud Kill Chain in 2025"). What an exercise shows is whether your recall request and complaint would go out quickly and complete.

Is this legal advice? No. This page is a procedural guide drawn from the public record. Counsel decides what your contracts, your bank's terms and your regulator require.

Brief an advisor